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Abstract
This paper provides new perspectives on USA landlord-tenant contracting, where technical change
is creating scale economies in farming and farm enlargements, and results that are important to the
sustainability ofland use and environmental quality. We develop a conceptual model oflandlord-tenant
contracting that emphasizes minimizing transactions costs and setting incentives for effort when tenants
are risk averse, and provide empirical evidence from the USA supporting the model. We find support
for both models and that landlords' as well as tenants' attributes determine whether a contract is crop
share or cash. We also find that highly erodible land and land that is expected to remain in farming in the
future are most likely to be operated with share contracts, which include owners' interests in production
and management decisions. We then examine evidence showing how contract choice affects the adoption
of short- versus long-term conservation practices, participation in public conservation programmes,
and tendencies for conversion of farmland to urban uses. We conclude that, under diverse economic,
technical, climatic, ecological and political conditions, crop-share contracts have sustainability advantages
relative to cash rental contracts.
Additional keywords: cash rental contracts, conservation programmes, crop-share contracts, incentives,
risk sharing, transaction costs
Introduction
In all parts of the world that have private land ownership or private property, a variety
of institutions have developed to facilitate agricultural production (Roumasset, 1995;
Oskam & Feng, zo08). This includes the use and management ofland for agricultural
and associated purposes, including the bundling of property rights, which is important
in Europe (Otsuka et a!', 199z). Agricultural land is frequently categorized into the
following tenure types: owner-operated lands, where the farmer farms only land that
he owns (without hired labour), tenant-operated lands where the tenant rents all of
the farm land that he operates, and part-owner operated lands, where the farmer uses
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owned and rented farmland in his farming operation. For example, in USA agriculture
in zo03, 6z% of the farms were operated by full owners; these were largely small
farms. Thirty-two percent of the farms were operated by part-owners; these were the
large farms. Six percent of the farms were operated by tenants who operated small
farms and rented all of the land that they farmed (Anon., zo06). In zooz, USA farm
operators rented 38% of their total farmland, which was a decline by 5 percentage
points relative to a decade earlier.
Hypothetical reasons for the existence and type of farmland leasing include:
risk-sharing, incentives for effort, maintenance of productivity or sustainability,
transaction costs, a credit constraint and screening/sorting. In North America, risk
sharing (Newberry & Stiglitz, 1979) and transaction costs (Allen & Lueck, zooz)
have received most of the recent emphasis (Fukunaga & Huffman; in press). The
institution of farmland tenancy has at times been under attack because of alleged
inefficient land and labour uses (Otsuka, zo07), but in recent years, new and more
penetrating thinking about optimal incentive contracting has shown that cash and
share-leasing of farm land can both be optimal, given the right set of circumstances
including bundling of rights to land for lease (Slangen & Polman, zo08). However,
the physical and biological attributes of the land, attributes of the tenant (ability, risk
preferences, cost of effort, opportunity cost of time, and credit worthiness) and of the
landlord (risk preferences, management ability, residence location relative to the land in
question, and asset portfolio) can all be taken into account under efficient contracting.
However, in developed countries, access to credit and management skills of tenants
are not central to landlord-tenant contract choice. In the USA, the dominant forms
oflandlord-tenant contracts are cash and share. With a cash lease, the tenant pays
the landlord a fixed nominal amount per hectare rented for the right to use the land
for agricultural purposes and then makes all the production and marketing decisions,
thereby bearing all the risk, but he also obtains all of the net return. With a share lease,
the landlord provides the land services and the tenant provides the labour, machinery
services and fuel. Moreover, the landlord and tenant share production and marketing
decisions, and the most common contract is to share equally (50-50) output produced
and current production expenses, e.g., fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides.' Because cash-
lease contracts are fixed in nominal payment for land services, e.g., US$300 (or 190
Euros) per hectare-year, and share contracts being stated in real terms as a share of
output and production expenses, share contracts can easily withstand a wider range
of changes in prices of outputs and inputs and crop yields without the parties needing
to renegotiate terms. But cash contract terms are more fragile. For example, with
the dramatic increase in grain and oilseed prices in late zo07 and early zo08, many
Midwestern USA farmland owners who have cash-lease terms that were set early last
fall are wishing that they could renegotiate their leases in the spring of zo08. When
renegotiation has occurred, cash rental rates are substantially higher.
The landlord-tenant models developed by agricultural economists have generally been
behind the curve in applying recent advances in principal-agent models to optimal incentive
construction in landlord-tenant contracting. Otsuka (zo07) hardly mentions principal-
agent models in his recent review of the literature dealing with efficient allocation ofland
across a wide range ofenvironments and countries, and only as an afterthought Roumasset
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(1995) includes some treatment ofa principal-agent model ofcontracting.
Although Stiglitz (1974) and Newberry & Stiglitz (1979) applied early versions
of principal-agent models to landlord-tenant contracting, this was before modelling
advances by Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987) and Holmstrom (1989), who are associated
with modern contracting theory, including incentive compatibility and participation
constraints (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). Their models consist oflinear contracts,
which are robust to unobservable and non-contractable effort, infeasibility of third-
party verification or enforcement and gaming strategies of agents over time. Optimal
contracts consist of two parts: (I) a fixed 'guarantee' payment, and (2) an incentive rate
that is a share of the principal's payoff Both agents and principals have an incentive to
follow through on their agreed upon arrangement or contract because the contracts are
constructed so that they are better off by doing so. The conceptual papers by Huffman
& Just (2004) and Fukunaga (2006) and the empirical paper by Fukunaga & Huffman
(in press) have recently enriched the landlord-tenant contracting literature.
The objective of this paper is to provide new perspectives on landlord-tenant
contracting that are important to the sustainability ofland and environmental quality.
As a reflection of the recent empirical research by Fukunaga & Huffman (in press),
we develop a conceptual model of contracting that incorporates models of transaction
costs and incentives for effort with risk sharing (between a tenant and a landlord) 2.
Furthermore, it will be shown that contract choice is related to the adoption of
short- versus long-term conservation practices, participation in public conservation
programmes and tendencies for conversion of farmland to urban uses. The final
chapter will draw conclusions about future research and policy needs in this area.
Risk sharing and transaction costs: setting incentives in a
complex environment
This chapter develops a model that encompasses two strands ofagency theory: (I) a principal-
agent model with incentives for effort with risk sharing, and (2) a model emphasizing low
transaction costs. Combining these diverse models into one model oflandlord-tenant
contracting is unusual but insightfuL Although it has been argued informally that tenant's
risk aversion increases the likelihood ofa crop-share contract and landlord's risk aversion
increases the likelihood ofa cash contract, no one has derived the argument directly from a
formal modeL However, in the next few paragraphs we explicitly derive these conditions.
Our model builds upon earlier models by Allen & Lueck (1999), Laffont &
Martimort (2002) and Huffman & Just (2004)' Let us assume the following simple
production function for farm output (y):
(I)
where L is the tenant's effort level and 15 is a random disturbance term following a
normal distribution with a zero mean and variance a2 The landlord is assumed to
offer a linear contract to the tenant of w ~ ay + p, where a is the share of output going
to the tenant and pis the landlord's guarantee to the tenant, wich can be negative as in
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cash rented. The tenant's private cost ofeffort is assumed to be represented by the simple
function that is quadratic in effort, ~ kP, where k denotes the cost sensitivity of the tenant's
effort. Given these definitions, the tenant is assumed to have the following utility function,
U[a(L + 0) + f3 - kPj2], which is a concave, monotonically increasing function. Finally,
the tenant's reservation utility is denoted as U0' which is assumed to be greater than zero.
Under a second-order Taylor approximation, the tenant's expected utility from effort Lis:
E[U(a(L + 0) + f3 - kPj2)] ~ U(E[I]) + E[U'(E[I]). ao] + ~E[U"(E[I]). a2 02] (2)
~ U(E[I]) + ~U"(E[I]). a2 02
where E is the expectation operator, E(l) ~ a(L + 0) + f3 - kPj2, U'( ) denotes the first
derivative of U with respect to I, and U"( ) the second derivative. Alternatively, let us
define CE as the tenant's certainty equivalent income from I and risk premium RP,
then CE ~ E(I) - RP. Expected utility of I now has a first-order Taylor approximation,
E[U(l) ~ U(CE) ~ U(E[I] - RP) ~ U(E[I]) - U'(E[I]) RP
Th r fi E . () d ( ) RP - r U"(E[I]) 2 2 _ r 2 2erelore, rom quatlOns 2 an 3, --ZU'(E[I]) a a --zrta a,
where r ~ U" jU' is the Arrow-Pratt definition of risk aversion, and rt denotes the
degree of risk aversion for the tenant (and rj denotes the degree of risk aversion of the
landlord). Thus, the tenant's optimal allocation of effort is determined as
mr {E[ I] - RP} ~mr{aL+ f3 - ~ k(L)2 - ~ a2 rta2}
Similarly, the landlord's certainty equivalent incomejwelfare is given by (r - a) L-
f3 - ~ rr (r - a)2 a2, and under these settings, the landlord sets the sharing rate a that
the tenant will accept
mwc{(r - alL"~ - f3 - ~ (r - a)2 rra2}
s.t.
D'~ arg m;uc{aL+ f3 - ~ k(L)2 - ~ a2rta2}
aD' + f3- ~ k(L")2 - ~ a2rta2 " Uo
(5)
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The first constraint in Equation (5) is the tenant's incentive constraint providing the
optimal marginal conditions for his effort, and the second constraint in Equation (5) guarantees
that the tenant is better offwith the contract offered than pursuing his next best alternative.
Solving the tenant's optimal incentive constraint, the tenant's effort is D' ~ ajk. If f3
cF 0, the tenant's participation constraint holds with equality (whenever the participation
holds with inequality, the landlord can reduce the fixed payment so that he is better off)
and the optimal f3 ~ Uo - aD' + ~ k(D')2 + ~ a2 rta2. Given these values of Ii' and f3, the
landlord chooses the sharing rate under the following updated statement:
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{a I k(a)2 I 2 2 I ( )2 2 u}max --- - --a ra -- I-a ra-a k2k 2 t 2 r 0 (6)
It can be shown that the general expression for the optimal sharing arrangement becomes:
Because a" cF I unless a 2 ~ 0, which implies that production is certain, or rt ~ rr ~ 0,
which implies that the tenant and landlord are risk neutral, the optimal contract
becomes some type of sharing arrangement.
It is useful to compare the welfare of the landlord under different contracting
solutions. Denote total landlord's welfare under an optimal contract as Jres, where the
subscript CS denotes crop share. Now suppose that the landlord gains from reducing
transaction costs (see Allen & Lueck, 1999) for a list of important transaction costs)
when he uses a cash-rent contract instead of the optimal crop-share contract, and
denote B as the added landlord benefits under cash rent. Then, the total welfare, when
the landlord uses cash-rent instead of the optimal crop-share contract, is denoted as:
I I I 2 BJre ~ - . - - - rta +
2 k 2
(8)
Thus, the landlord is better off under a crop-share contract if and only if
krt
2 a4
Jres - Jre ~---. -B> °
2 1+ k(rr + rt)a2
One can show that Jres - Jre is monotonically increasing in a2 , variance in production,
and in rt> tenant's risk aversion, and monotonically decreasing in ri' landlord's risk
aversion, and in B. The past literature on contract choice has implicitly relied on this result to
obtain testable hypotheses about the efficts ofrisk and transaction costs on contract choice.
Because key parameters in the optimal contract choice equations are not directly
observable, the empirical contracting literature uses proxy variables for various
parameters of these equations. Moreover, the authors of these studies normally assume
very simple linear proxies of the parameters and this undoubtedly leads to approximation
error. However, given that econometric specifications of these relationships include a
random disturbance term, the approximation error can be harmlessly included there,
provided that the regressors are not correlated with the errors.
An empirical model, data and results
Given the conceptual model oflandlord-tenant contracting developed in the foregoing,
the goal is to formulate an empirical model that can be fitted to a sample of contracts.
In particular, we present and discuss the empirical model for choice of a crop-share
contract, discuss the set of variables that relate to risk sharing and then the set of
variables that relate transaction costs. See Table I for the list ofvariables and definitions.
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Empirical model
Contract choice is a latent variable contracf[/or contract type, which is hypothesized to
have the following economic relationship:
(10)
(II)
where Xi denotes a vector of tenant i's attributes; Yi denotes a vector oflandlord
j's attributes; and Zij denotes the vector oflocal conditions in the area where the
contracting occurs, such as the contracted land area, the total market value of the
land and buildings on the contracted land, variability of area crop yields, erodibility of
area soils, as well as a constant term. These variables serve as proxies for underlying
conceptual parameters in the conceptual model. Moreover, cit is a random disturbance
term that exists in part because our empirical model is at best a rough approximation
to the conceptual model oflandlord-tenant contract choice. However, what can be
observed is not contracf[j' but rather, the dichotomous indicator contract ij
{
1 if contract"· > °contractij ~ '. lL, or 1 for crop-share, and ° for a cash lease.
0, If contract;;"" °
Our likelihood function then becomes:
IlF(a'xr+ {3'Yj + y'Zij)contractij {1 - F(a'xi + {3'Yj + y'Zij)}(r-contractij),
IJ
(12)
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where Ff(v) denotes a cumulative distribution function Ff evaluated at v. Hence, Ff(a'xi
+ f3'Yj + y'Zij ) gives the probability of a crop-share contract being chosen, conditional
on the covariates, X, Yand z. For example, if the CijS follow a standard unit normal with
a mean of 1 and a variance of 0, then F( ) follows a cumulative standard unit normal
distribution function. Equation (12), which is the joint probability of the sample viewed
as a function of the unknown parameters, is denoted as the likelihood function for the
empirical model. Now maximize the likelihood function with respect to the unknown
parameters a, {3, and y to obtain parameter estimates of the probit model of crop-share
choice (Greene, 2003). A positive value for the coefficient of an explanatory variable
implies that an increase in the associated explanatory variable increases the probability
that a crop-share contract is the contract choice (and reduces the probability that a cash
contract is the choice).
Risk-related factors
The erosion of soil from a landlord's land is a major concern, unless he anticipates
converting it to non-farm uses soon, and according to Allen & Lueck (1992; 1993;
1999), a landlord monitoring for overuse of his leased land is an important transaction
cost facing the landlord. In order to capture the effect of this risk, Fukunaga &
Huffman (in press) proxy the potential for 'overuse' by a land erodibility index for the
county where the tenant resides. Under the transactions cost motive for contract choice,
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the landlord is expected to offer a crop-share contract to reduce erosion risk on his land.
However, if the landlord expects to convert his land to non-farm uses in the near
future, erosion concerns will be relatively unimportant and he will offer a cash-rental
contract (Fukunaga & Huffman, in press). This likelihood of conversion to non-farm
uses can be proxied by the Beale-code land use index, a code that ranges from 1 to 9,
with 1 indicating the most urbanized areas and 9 indicating the most rural areas. For
example, if the code is 1, i.e., the land is urban, then it is reasonable for the landlord to
anticipate conversion of his farmland to non-farm uses soon and he will have greatly
reduced concerns about erosion under a cash lease. Thus, the landlord will be less
likely to offer a crop-share lease. In contrast, if the land is located in a remote rural
area, then it is more likely to remain in agricultural use for the foreseeable future, and
the landlord is more likely to offer crop-share. Thus, following this concern for future
productivity of rented land, landlords in areas with higher Beale-code numbers are
more likely to offer a crop-share contract.
As a tenant becomes wealthier, he has larger net worth to withstand a bad harvest
under crop share, and the general belief is that ifhis wealth increases, he becomes less
risk averse and is less likely to accept a crop-share contract. However, as a landlord at
retirement age gets wealthier, he may prefer to avoid production and marketing risk
and lease for cash. Using this reasoning, an elderly and wealthy landlord is expected
to offer a cash lease. Proxies for wealth are the value of farm assets and of agricultural
land and buildings net of debt (owned assets).
One of the important risks of farming is crop yield variability. Fukunaga &
Huffman (in press) proxy this by an indicator of crop yield variability in the area where
leased land is located. The USDA's county level annual yield data over 1990 to 1999
(Anon., 2005) were converted into a county average standardized yield variability index
using data for the yields of maize, soya bean, hay, common bean, and other crops.
Because output units differ across different crops, Fukunaga & Huffman (in press)
divided the standard deviation oflocal county yields by their respective mean values.
Finally, using data for the lo-year average share of harvested hectares for each crop,
they summed up the standardized deviations and obtained a weighted and standardized
yield variability index. Then, as the local yield variability index increases, landlords
are less likely to offer crop-share leases whereas tenants prefer crop share in these
circumstances. However, iflandlords and tenants are risk neutral rather than risk
averse, an increase in yield variability will not affect the type of contract that they offer
or accept, but risk-averse tenants will be more likely to accept a crop-share contract and
risk-averse landlords more likely to offer cash contracts.
Transaction cost factors
Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) argue that proxies for transaction costs include
the type of crop-rotation, the number oflandlords from which a tenant contracts,
the hectares of contracted land, the total value of contracted land, the value of farm
buildings and dwellings on the contracted land, the value of the tenant's dwelling on
the contracted land, whether the landlord lives on the contracted land or not, whether
the landlord lives close to the contracted land or not, and the Beale code for the area
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where the tenant resides.
In a grain-oilseed crop rotation, Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) argue that a crop-
share contract is more likely to be chosen because it is relatively easy for the landlord
and tenant to divide the product from the land, as it is not perishable, and hence each
of them can market his own share of the product (Allen & Lueck, 1993; 1999). With
the landlord having easy access to marketing channels, he is more likely to offer a crop-
share contract. On the other hand, if vegetables or fruits are produced on leased land,
dividing the output between landlord and tenant is more problematic, as the product is
more perishable, which means that transaction costs are high to the landlord for a crop-
share contract. Hence, under these circumstances, the landlord is less likely to offer a
crop-share contract.
Under modern principal agent theory with unobservable effort, optimal contracts
are constructed to be incentive compatible for the tenant (and landlord). Since
monitoring is ineffective, it is not undertaken. Under the transaction costs perspective,
contracts are constructed to reduce these monitoring costs, which decrease the
likelihood of the landlord offering crop share. Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) proxied
the landlord-monitoring costs using two variables tied to the location of the landlord
relative to his land; whether the landlord lives on his leased land or whether he lives
within 5 miles of his leased land. The idea is that landlords who do not live on or near
their leased land have higher costs of monitoring the activity of their tenants relative
to timeliness of field operations and judicious use of the land (Allen & Lueck, 1993;
1999). Hence, under the transaction cost model, the landlord is less likely to offer a
crop-share contract, but under the incentive-compatible principal-agent contract, the
landlord knows that monitoring is unnecessary and his residence relative to the leased
land is unimportant.
Externalities may arise with tenants who contract with multiple landowners, as
is common in the USA and Canada. As the number of contracts a tenant has with
landlords increases, the greater the risk to any landlord that farming activities on his
land will be conducted at a suboptimal date. Hence, each landlord is less likely to offer
a cash contract in these circumstances. Also, as the number of contracted assets (land,
buildings and dwellings) increases, the importance of the landlord's land to the tenant
increases and represents a larger potential loss to opportunistic behaviour. Hence, crop
share is more likely to be offered and chosen.
Data
Fukunaga & Huffman (in press) used as primary data the 1999 US Agricultural
Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS; Anon., 2005). It is a relatively
comprehensive data set consisting of tenants' demographic information, economic
attributes and household characteristics, and landlords' demographic information and
economic attributes. Survey questionnaires were first sent to USA producers/tenants
included in the 1998 Census of Agriculture. Farmers were asked to answer a set of
questions and, where relevant, to provide the addresses and names of their landlords.
Questionnaires were then sent to this list oflandlords. Hence, this procedure made it
possible to identify a tenant and a landlord for every contract in the data set. See Table I
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Table 1. Definitions ofvariables and summary statistics, 1999 US AELOS Data (n ~ 44,515).
Variables Definitions Mean SD
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
contracLtype ~ I ifcontract is cropshare, ~ 0 ifcontract is cash rent 0.20
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Regions
NE
MW
SR
WR
Tenant's farm type
grain_oil
tobaccoJotton
vegetablcfruit
otheLcrop
beef
dairy
otheLanimal
crop_type
~ I iflocation oftenant's farm is Northeast region
~ I iflocation oftenant's farm is Midwest region
~ I iflocation oftenant's farm is South region
~ I iflocation oftenant's farm is West region
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is grain and/or oilseed production
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is tobacco and/or cotton production
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is vegetable and/or fruit production
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is other crop production
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is beefcattle ranching and farming
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is dairy
~ I iftype oftenant's farm is producing other animals
~ I ifgrailLoil~Ior tobaccoJotton~I
0.12 0·33
0·37 0.48
0·35 0.48
0.16 0.36
0·39 0·49
0.12 0·33
0.08 0.27
0.08 0.29
O.ro 0.30
0.15 0.36
0.17 0·37
0.52 0.50
Other tenant's attributes
Lage age oftenant 51.65 12.09
Lgender ~ I iftenant is male 0.98 0.12
Lwhite ~ I ifrace oftenant is white 0.98 0.14
ind_farm ~ I iftype oftenant's farm is individual farm 0.63 0.48
n_family_members number offamily members living in tenant's household 3.17 1.5 2
LlLlandlords number oflandlords whom tenant contracts with 13·35 19.83
LtotaLmcome_net tenant's net total income (US$I,OOO) 206.05 795.27
Lfarm_share ~ I if share offarm income in tenant's household is greater than 75% 0.50 0.50
LtotaLassets value offarm and nonfarm assets in tenant's household (US$roo,ooo) 23.86 67·53
Lshare_owned share of number ofacres ofland owned by tenant (%) 29.64 26.64
Ldwelling3alue market value oftenant's dwelling on contracted land (US$roo,ooo) 0.08 0.31
LdebLfree ~ I iftenant has no debt 0.12 0·33
LdL5° ~ I iftenant's farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.13 0·34
Landlord's attributes
Lage
Lwhite
LlLtenants
Lope_99
LliLon_farm
UivJlose
age oflandlord
~ I if race oflandlord is white
number oftenants whom landlord contracts with
~ I iflandlord operated farm or ranch in 1999
~ I iflandlord lives on contracted land
~ I ifUiLon_farm ~O and landlord resides within 8 km from
contracted land
~ I iflandlord's net farm income is greater than US$25,000
O.II
0.06
14·47
0.23
2.82
0.23
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Table 1. (cont'd)
Variables Definitions Mean SD
Lfann_share
Lfann_assets
LtotaLvalue
Uand_owned
LdebLfree
LdL5°
totaLvalue
~ I ifshare ofgross fann income in landlord household is 76% or more 0.08
market value ofall farm assets owned by landlord (US$roo,ooo) 2.83
market value ofall lands and buildings owned by landlord (US$roo,ooo) 5.50
number ofunits owned by landlord (40 hal 5.32
~ I iflandlord has no debt 0.86
~ I iflandlord's farm debt-asset ratio is greater than 50% 0.05
market value ofland and buildings on contracted land (US$roo,ooo) 2.76
0.27
9.68
I37·79
34·55
0·35
0.21
9·55
Other factors
yield3ariability
averagcbeale
contracted_area
land_erodibility
standardized and weighted production variability for county of
tenant's residence
average of Beale code in 1993 and 2003 for county oftenant's
residence
number ofunits (40 hal
erodibility index for county of tenant's residence
0.26
4·74
2.17
2.68
o.ro
388
for a list of the variables and their definitions.
In the data set, the sample unit is not an individual tenant or landlord, but a
particular contract, and, hence, a tenant may appear more than once in the data set, but
always in combination with a different landlord. Likewise, a landlord could appear more
than once if he contracts with more than one tenant. After some refinements, the data
set included 44,515 landlord-tenant contracts. From the results (Table I) it appears that
the tenants were on average 51.6 years of age and 13.5 years younger than the landlords.
Hence, the majority oflandlords associated with our contracts were retirement aged.
Roughly 70% of the landlords were women, many of them elderly widows whose
husbands had been farmers. Forty-two percent oflandlords lived near their leased
land, but only n% lived on the premises. The tenants contracted on average with 13
landlords, and the landlords associated with these contracts contracted on average with
only 1.4 tenants. These data are a reflection of what happened in the USA over the past
four decades: a rapid increase in farm size due to consolidation of existing farmland
into fewer farming units. Hence, during the post-War II period it has been atypical
to have landlords holding large tracts ofland and each owner leasing land to a large
number of tenants, as occurred in the post-Civil War era in the southern states of the
USA. Individual farmers who rent farmland are typically part-owners who use leased
farmland as a means of acquiring sufficient land to take account of scale size in the use
of farm machinery.
Empirical results
Our empirical model oflandlord-tenant contracting was fitted (Table 2, column I). The
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood estimation ofprobit models ofcrop share contract choice for USA Farmland,
1999 US AELOS Data (n ~ 44,515). I
Explanatory
variables
Intercept
Regions
NE
MW
SR
Farm type
grain_oil
tobacco Jotton
vegetablcfruit
beef
dairy
otheLanimal
Tenant's attributes
Lage
Lgender
Lwhite
ind_farm
n_family_members
LtLlandlords
LtotaLmcome_net
Lfarm_share
LtotaLassets
Lshare owned
Ldwelling3alue
LdebLfree
LdL5°
Landlord's attributes
Lage
Lwhite
Lope_99
LliLon_farm
UivJlose
Lfarm_income
Lfarm_share
(I)
Contract choice: landlord,
tenant and other attributes
Value In(likelihoodfn)
~ 18,573-12
-1.2606***
-0.5024***
-0.3806***
0.3097***
-0.0075
-0.2823***
-0.0454
-0·7333***
-0·3II8***
0.0002
O.OII2
0.2403***
0.0198
-0.0012
-O.OIOO***
<0.0001**
0.062 5***
-0.0019***
-0.0047***
-0.0136
0.0656***
-0.0407**
0.0038***
0.1522***
0.0380
-0.0985***
-0.1880***
0.1760***
0.0069
(2)
Contract choice: no Marginal effect of regressor
landlord attributes change on prob. (%) ofcrops-
hare [using coefficients in (I)] 2
Value In(likelihoodfn)
~ 18,713.34
-1.3207*** -0.01717
-0.5264*** -0.00684
-0.4033*** -0.00518
0.3240*** 0.00422
0.0198 -O.OOOIO
-0.2919*** -0.00385
-0.0263 -0.00062
-0.7517*** -0.00999
-0.3090*** -0.00425
0.0005 0.000003
0.0192 0.00015
0.2725*** 0.00327
0.0186 0.00027
-0.0012 -0.00002
-0.OI09*** -0.00014
<0.0001*** 0.000001
0.0664*** 0.00085
-0.0018*** -0.00003
-0.0049*** -0.00006
-0.0035 -0.00019
0.0642*** 0.00089
-0.0378* -0.00055
0.00005
0.00207
0.00052
-0.00134
-0.00256
0.00240
0.00009
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Table 2. (cont'd)
(I) (2)
Explanatory
variables
Contract choice: landlord, Contract choice: no Marginal effect of regressor
tenant and other attributes landlord attributes change on prob. (%) ofcrops-
hare [using coefficients in (I)] 2
Value In(likelihoodfn)
~ 18,573-12
Value In(likelihoodfn)
~ 18,713.34
390
Landlord's attributes
Lfann_assets 0.0387*** 0.00053
LtotaLvalue -0.0013*** -0.00002
Larea_owned 0.0006 0.00001
LdebLfree 0.0006 0.00001
LdL5° -0.0463 -0.00063
totaLvalue -0.0414*** -0.00056
Other factors
yield_ variability 0.35 05*** 0·4497*** 0.00048
averagcbeale 0.0318*** 0.0361*** 0.00043
contracted_area 0.0002 <0.0001 0.000003
land_ erodibility 0.0777*** 0.0796*** 0.00ro6
I The one, two, or three asterisks to the right of estimated coefficients indicate that a coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the ro, 5, and 1% level, respectively. The reference region in the models is the West of
the USA.
2 The evaluation ofthe marginal effects is at these sample means of the regressors (see Table I)' giving a value
ofthe density function of 0.01362.
Source: adapted from Fukunaga & Huffman (in press).
fact that a sizeable number of coefficients in the equation for crop-share contract are
statistically significant is evidence that landlords and tenants are risk averse and that
transactions costs matter. Moreover, the hypothesis that landlords' attributes are largely
unimportant to contract choice is rejected. The unrestricted model for this test and the
restricted model under the null hypothesis are reported in Table 2, columns I and 2,
respectively. The sample value of the x2 - statistic for this test was 280, and the tabled
value of the x2 - statistic with 13 degrees of freedom at P < 0.05 was 27.7.
Returning to the results in column I Table 2 the following conclusions can be
drawn: (I) the estimated coefficient for the area yield variability (and significantly
different from zero) supports the hypothesis that as production variability increases,
the probability increases that a crop-share contract is chosen, (2) an increase in the
erodibility index of the land increases the likelihood of share tenancy, suggesting
that landlords are concerned about conservation of their farmland, (3) the estimated
coefficient of the tenant's household income being primarily from farming, increases
the probability that crop share is chosen, (4) the estimated coefficients of total tenant
assets and the share of operated land that is owned are negative, implying that crop
share is less likely to be chosen, and (5) the estimated coefficient for the tenant being
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debt-free is positive, indicating that crop share is more likely to be chosen. These results
support risk sharing between landlords and tenants.
The tenant's age does not significantly affect contract choice, which is - as we
expected - given the pressures for expansion in USA agriculture and landowners
selecting against risk-averse tenants. However, the age of the landlord is important, with
older landlords showing a slight preference for crop share, other things being equal.
If the landlord's farm income is higher than US$25,000, or the market value
of farm land and buildings or hectares owned increases, a crop-share contract is
significantly more likely to be chosen. Holding the above variables constant, as
the market value of the landlord's land and buildings on leased land increases, the
probability of a crop-share lease decreases. These results suggest that landlords are risk
averse and that risk sharing is also important to them.
If a tenant's farm is categorized as a grain-oilseed farm, the probability that
crop share is chosen increases, and if the tenant's farm is categorized as either a
vegetable-fruit farm, a dairy farm or a farm that raises other animals, a crop-share
contract is less likely to be chosen. If the landlord lives on or close to the contracted
land, a crop-share contract is significantly less likely to be chosen. If the tenant
contracts with many rather than one landlord, his transaction costs increase and his
landlords face a possible tenant-shirking problem or risk of untimely completion of
key farming activities so cash is more likely to be chosen. If the landlord lives on the
land he can easily monitor potentially land-degrading activities of a tenant under a
cash rental lease, which could terminate an otherwise long-term relationship. This
becomes more difficult ifhe lives many miles away, in which case he would offer a
crop-share lease, which has direct incentives for judicious management of the leased
land. The estimated coefficient for the local Beale code index is positive (and statistically
significant), indicating that as the area where the leased land is located becomes more
rural and agricultural, the probability that a crop-share contract is offered increases.
These results support the transaction costs hypothesis. Previous empirical studies of
landlord-tenant contracting have largely ignored the attributes oflandlords. However,
as the above summary of results shows, a number oflandlord attributes are important
in contract choice. Furthermore, in a test of the null hypotheses that landlord attributes
do not matter in explaining contract choice, the hypothesis is rejected at P < O.or. The
sample value of the associated ;('-value was 280 (d.f. ~ 13). The tabled value of the x2 -
value at P < 0.01 was 28. Hence, economic analyses oflandlord-tenant contracting
cannot be taken seriously if they ignore the attributes of landlords - both landlords' and
tenants' attributes are important to understanding real contract choice and sustainable
contracting relationships.3
Using the estimated coefficients from regression (I) in Table 2, the marginal
effect of changing an explanatory variable was computed (Table 2, column 3). In
assessing the contributions of marginal effects, one must make an assessment ofwhat
is the relevant unit. For dichotomous variables, comparing the size of the estimated
coefficients is sufficient (column I), but for continuous variables, it is useful to look at
the predicted marginal change associated with a one standard deviation change in the
explanatory variable (Table I). With this scheme as a reference, it is clear that region of
the country and type of farm matter a relatively large amount in contract choice. Among
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the dichotomous tenant attributes, race is most important, and among the landlord
attributes, race, living close to the farm, and having a net farm income greater than
US$25,000 matter most. Among the other variables, market value of all farm assets
owned by the landlord, the value ofland and buildings on the contracted land and the
land erodibility index have relatively large marginal effects. Looking at the marginal
effects from a different perspective, if the market value of the landlord's land and
buildings on the contracted land were to increase by a factor of 1000, other things being
equal, the probability that a crop-share contract is chosen would be reduced by half a
percent. And if the value of a tenant's total farm and non-farm assets were to increase
by a factor of 100,000 the probability of a crop-share contract would be reduced by
one-quarter of a percent. It may, however, be unrealistic to think of such large changes
while holding all of the other regressors constant.
Discussion
Allen & Lueck (2002) have argued and our results support the fact that the inherent
tendency for farmland to erode is a major concern to landlords when leasing their land.
Also, our results show that the location of contracted land relative to urban-rural areas,
which we interpret as a reflection of the likely future use of the land for agricultural
versus non-agricultural purposes, is an important factor in contract choice. Keeping
soil erosion at a low rate and land quality high are important to sustainability of
land for farming. Moreover, a crop-share contract gives the landowner a role in farm
production and management decisions, which can moderate a tenant's aggressive
farming tendencies to exhaust future productivity. Other literature can be used to
shed more light on the decision to adopt sustainable farming practices such as the
use of conservation practices. Some conservation practices have an immediate cost
saving effect and a longer term saving effect on soil and water erosion. An example
is conservation tillage, which includes planting systems that maintain a significant
soil surface cover with crop residues on highly erodible land to reduce soil erosion by
water or for controlling wind erosion. Other conservation practices, such as grassed
waterways, contour farming and strip cropping, require investment up front and
returns in the intermediate to distant future. Building terraces on highly sloped land
involves large costs and a long-term payoff period. Clearly, private owner-operators
should have the longest planning horizon when considering investments in
conservation practices because they can sell the land, but many farmers that own part
or all of their land choose to quit farming but to retain ownership.
A number of empirical studies have examined the impact ofland tenure on the
adoption of conservation practices by USA farmers. Rahm & Huffman (1984), Norris &
Baatie (1987), Belnap & Saupe (1988) and Featherstone & Goodwin (1993) have used as
the tenure variable 'the share of a farm's acres that are rented' to indicate tenure status
on USA farms. Others have used dummy variables to identify operators as full-owners,
owner-renters or full renters (Lynne et a!., 1988), or to identify fields as owner-operated
or tenant-operated (Fuglie & Klotz, 1995). Alternatively, a few studies have conditioned
on farm operators (Lee, 1980; Lee & Stewart, 1983; Heimlich, 1985), using dummy
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variables to distinguish full-owner operators, part-owner operators, and non-operator
landlords. These studies are noteworthy for their lack of evidence other than land
tenure matters for use ofland conserving practices.
In contrast, Soule et al. (zooo) have shown that the structure of agriculture as
reflected in land use by USA owners and cash and share tenants is important to
adoption of conservation practices. In their study of maize producers in the 1996
Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS; Anon., zooS), they distinguish
conservation practices according to the timing of costs and returns. They show that
cash-renters are less likely than owner-operators to use conservation tillage (a residual
management practice for highly erodible land, which reduces labour, machinery and
fuel costs now and has longer term effects on soil depth) but that tenants operating
under a crop-share contract are notA This is as expected because under share tenancy
the tenant usually faces incentives for judicious uses of the land because the landlord
is involved in production decision making. However, Soule et al. (zooo) show that both
cash and crop-share tenants are less likely than owner-operators to adopt practices
that provide benefits only over a medium (or long) length time horizon (e.g., grassed
waterways, strip cropping and contour farming on hillsides). These results support the
belief that share tenancy has weaker incentives than owner-operators for conservation
practice requiring buildings or establishing structures.
In the USA, where real wage rates have been rising and new technologies have size
economies, farms are under strong pressure to expand their size of farming operations.
With private land ownership, retired farmers, widows of farmers, and non-farm
farmland owners may prefer to hold their farmland as part of a portfolio of assets for
retirement income rather than to sell it. Hence, it seems implausible to contemplate the
possibility of only owner-operators. The current value of farmland reflects conversion
to non-agricultural uses in the future, so current land prices may be high relative to
cash rental rates or cash equivalent share leases. Hence, farmers at any point in time
may prefer that some of the farmland is owned by non-farmers because this permits
broader risk sharing. Owning one's farmland is not necessary for being a farmer, nor
is it optimal diversification of asset holdings from risk-return trade-off considerations
(Anon., zo08).
Conclusions
In countries that have private land ownership, share and cash leases have co-existed
for decades. Although share-leases are less frequent in USA agriculture today than 50
years ago, they continue to account for about one-quarter of all leases. Furthermore, in
the Midwest where farm consolidation has been occurring relatively rapidly and most
of the leased land is for growing maize and soya bean, roughly one-half of the leases
are share-leases. Our results have shown that both contracting with a goal of reducing
transaction costs and setting incentives for effort under risk sharing are needed to
explain actual contracting in the United States ofAmerica. Furthermore, we found
that attributes of tenants and landlords that affect the size of potential transaction
costs and risk-sharing incentives affect the probability that a crop-share contract is
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chosen. Our work furthermore has shown that the attributes oflandlords affect the
contract that is chosen, something that has frequently been ignored in landlord-tenant
contracting. For example, iflandlords live on or close to the land that they lease, the
rental contract is less likely to be a crop-share one. Also, if the market value of the land
and buildings contracted increases, the probability of a crop-share contract is reduced.
Moreover, we summarized results showing that the choice of conservation practices on
farmland is related to land tenancy: farms operated by owners, share tenants and cash
tenants see the adoption of soil conservation practices differently, with share tenants
behaving more like owners than cash tenants. Thus, a hybrid model oflandlord-tenant
contracting is central to sustainable land tenure and land productivity.
The share contract remains a contract that is more robust to unexpected changes in
output prices, input prices and crop yields than the cash lease. The reason is that a fixed
sharing arrangement sets the rental rate as a share of the output (and pre-determined
share of production expenses). Hence, these contracts can be expected to be serviceable
over a much longer time period without modification than a cash rental contract that
sets as a fixed nominal annual payment per year for the use ofland. And in fact, the
empirical evidence for the USA is that share leases have on average been in effect for
significantly longer periods than have cash leases. The ideal environment for cash
leases is one with stable input and output prices and crop yields.
So we conclude that under diverse economic conditions crop-share contracts are
long-run sustainable contracts relative to cash leases. Moreover, they create stronger
incentives for long-term sustainability ofland quality for agricultural purposes because
of the direct involvement of landlords in production and management decisions.
Hence, extension agricultural economists should undertake an education programme
to help land owners better understand the advantages and disadvantages of crop share
and cash leases under diverse economic, technical, climatic, ecological and political
conditions. However, for land owners who are in the conservative and late phase of
their life, cash leases seem likely to provide the certainty of income that they need to
meet retirement expenses and relief from the burden of participatory management.
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Notes
1. In Iowa under a crop-share lease, the dominant contract is without a fixed term, landlord and tenant
share fifty-fifty the output produced and production expenses (for seed, liming, fertilizer, herbicide,
insecticide and any custom pesticide application). See Edwards et al. (2004). It is the custom that if the
landlord or tenant is going to terminate the lease, notification must be given in August before the next
crop year, which starts officially I March. See Allen & Lueck (1999) for information on share contracts ir
some other locations ofthe USA.
2 Our landlord-tenant contracts contain an incentive for the landlord and tenant to follow through on
their agreement, i.e., they are incentive compatible. Also, repeat contracting is important in landlord-
tenant relations and this creates trust between parties.
3 Although the explanatory variables vary in their degree of correlation with each other, this does not
permit individual explanatory variables from having statistically significant coefficients.
4 Conservation tillage in this study includes any tillage and planting system that leaves 30% or more of
the soil surface covered with crop residue to reduce soil erosion by water or, for control of wind erosion,
maintains at least II20 kg per hectare of small-grain-residue equivalent on the surface throughout the
critical wind erosion period.
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